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SIR WILLIAM MacGREGOR 
AND QUEENSLAND 
[By R. B. JOYCE, Reader in History, University of 
Queensland] 
(Read at a Meeting of the Society on 26 AprU 1973) 
Your president in his kind invkation to me to speak to 
your society did not restrict me ki any subject beyond the 
general title of Sir WiUiam MacGregor. In speaking to a 
Queensland audience I think I should concentrate on his 
relationship with that colony and State, which was to become 
his favourite part of AustraUa. 
Twenty years ago, when I last addressed this society, I 
spoke of the British New Guinea syndicate affair of 1898^, 
an affair which placed MacGregor's relationship with 
Queensland at a low ebb for the then Queensland premier 
T. J. Byrnes became one of MacGregor's strongest oppon-
ents. You may know this affair was one in which MacGregor 
supported a British company — the British New Guinea 
syndicate — in its offer to purchase 250,000 acres of New 
Guinea for economic development. Byrnes crkicised hkn as 
he beUeved the syndicate was a danger to the Queensland 
sugar industry and to AustraUan national rights as agakist 
British rights. 
My themes will stem initiaUy from the conflicting points I 
have mentioned; to trace how MacGregor's relationships 
with Queensland changed. Thus MacGregor was criticised 
by Queensland's Premier in 1898, and this criticism was not 
atypical of the relationship of some Queenslanders to him. 
Yet his best friend Samuel Walker Griffith was a Queens-
lander. MacGregor favoured British interests against those 
of Queensland in 1898, yet he came to defend Queensland's 
expansion and its sugar industry. MacGregor harshly 
criticised Queensland's Aboriginal and Torres Strak Islands 
policies. Yet he was to admit that Australia, including 
Queensland, was better fitted to rule primkive people than 
was Britain. Besides this hate/love relationship, my second 
theme will be the relevance of MacGregor to Queensland in 
the present day. In my biography of MacGregor I made this 
a general point, "how many of . . . [his] policies were not 
1. R. B. Joyce, 'The British New Guinea Syndicate Affair', Journal of the Royal 
Queensland Historical Society, V. 1, 1953, pp. 771-93. 
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SIR WILLIAM MacGREGOR 
(A po:-trait taken during his Queensland Governorship) 
overthrown, and how many of his ideas are still strikingly 
relevant"^. Specifically in regard to Queensland, Mac-
Gregor's views are still relevant on where the boundary 
should lie between Queensland and New Guinea; on policies 
towards Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders; on State 
rights against Federal powers; on University standards and 
research standards generally — "his insistence on a scientific 
approach, and on careful research into every problem"^ 
EARLIER HOSTILITY 
MacGregor's first relationship with Queensland was 
hostUe and arose when he was in Fiji. He had reached Fiji, 
his second colonial post, in 1875 having been invited by his 
Governor in the SeycheUes (Sir Arthur Gordon) to come 
and assist him in both medical and administrative tasks. 
2. R. B. Joyce, Sir William MacGregor, O.U.P., 1971, pp. 388-9. 
3. Ibid, p. 389. 
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Gordon had been impressed by this young Scottish doctor's 
devotion to his medical tasks, especially in relation to in-
specting African labourers on the SeycheUes' sugar planta-
tions where he "secured the detection and punishment of 
two or three large proprietors who habituaUy cheated their 
labourers of a large proportion of their pay and rations. The 
result. . . [was] most beneficial to the labourers generally 
and . . . caused a more rigid adherence throughout aU the 
islands of the group to the law and regulations on the sub-, 
ject"". MacGregor's attitude to Queensland partly stemmed 
from this care for labourers which he continued in Fiji, since 
he regarded Queensland as a colony which was over-exploit-
ing Pacific Islanders (the so-called Kanakas) to expand its 
sugar industry. 
Yet in Fiji MacGregor became aware of the opposite side 
of the problem, the need of the colony for finance for de-
velopment, and how enterprises such as the AustraUan-based 
Colonial Sugar Refining Company needed government aid if 
Fiji — including its Fijian subjects — was to prosper. He 
argued that only outside investment and continued planter 
enterprise could keep any form of government going in Fiji 
and he was unsympathetic with the extremes of those who 
believed "that the employer of a black or brown man is a 
cheat and a conspirator . . . A genuine case of bad treatment 
is far from common here. I would not myself be a manager, 
overseer or planter in this country for any inducement . . . I 
am sure that His Excellency wiU soon see that he must re-
cognise that the employer is also entitled to justice"^. 
It was an attempt to see both sides of the case that helped 
to explain my hate/love phrase: he could hate the abuses 
and excesses of employers with employees; but at the same 
time appreciate the case of the employers. 
CRITICAL OF ABUSES 
Likewise with Queensland's policies towards Aboriginals, 
his views were being shaped before he reached the colony 
and he was critical of abuses. Generally he thought Queens-
land's reputation was bad, thus when an ex-Queensland 
Government agent and sub-lieutenant in the Queensland 
Navy applied for a position with the Fijian police, Mac-
Gregor commented that "it may be doubted that a man with 
a Queensland 'knowledge of blacks' would be a desirable 
4. Sir Arthur Gordon to Colonial Oflice, 8 November 1873 Mauritius Archives, 
Vol. SD 121. 
-•i. MacGregor to Gordon, 17 July 1887, Stanmore Papers, British Museum. 
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SIR WILLIAM MacGREGOR and SIR SAMUEL GRIFFITH 
poUceman here"^ because of MacGregor's belief in the poor 
quality of Queensland's policy. 
In December 1885 MacGregor went as Fiji's representa-
tive to the meeting of the Federal Council in Tasmania. At 
this time the future of the protectorate of New Guinea, 
which had been proclaimed a year before in November 
1884, was being discussed. MacGregor showed his interest 
in the fate of the Papuans in his speech in which he argued 
that their protection must be the prime motive of any 
administrator who was appointed''. Queensland was directly 
involved, for the President of the Federal CouncU was a 
Queenslander, Griffith, and as it seemed inevitable that 
Queensland, as the adjacent colony to New Guinea and the 
one which under Sir Thomas Mcllwraith had purported to 
annex the island, would be concerned in its future adminis-
tration. 
FRIENDSHIP WITH GRIFFITH 
This was MacGregor's first meeting with Griffith; from it 
stemmed a close friendship which was to endure throughout 
MacGregor minute, 29 November 1886, on W. H. Keays-Young Chapman to 
Colonial Secretary (Fiji), 29 October 1886, C.S.O. Inwards 86/2236 Archives 
Fiji and the Western Pacific High Commission, Suva. 
Speech, 3 February 1886, Federal Council of Australasia Debates, Hobart 
Session 1886, pp. 136-7. 
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their Uves. I am involved, too, as my reading of their letters 
whetted my appetite for attempting the biography of Griffith, 
a task in which I am now engaged. Why did a friendship 
develop between these two men? Can such a question be 
answered? Both were of much the same age, MacGregor was 
39, Griffith 40; both were migrants from the British Isles, 
MacGregor of Scottish parents from the Donside near Aber-
deen in Scotland, Griffith of an English father and a Welsh 
mother from Merthyr Tydfil in Wales; both came from 
famiUes that were not wealthy, MacGregor's father was a 
labourer, Griffith's a Congregational minister; both had 
briUiant University careers, MacGregor beginning in Arts 
and then turning to medicine (one of his professors said he 
had "a very complete medical education, is possessed of 
excellent talents, and has had unusually good opportunities 
of acquiring a practical acquaintance with the various 
departments of the profession"^), Griffith completing a 
brilliant Arts course at Sydney University — with first class 
honours in Classics, Mathematics and Natural Sciences 
before turning to his law training; more important, perhaps, 
were their shared interests in certain questions, immedately 
relevant was their concern for the treatment of primitive 
peoples, MacGregor from his years in the Seychelles and in 
Fiji where he was concerned for the welfare of Polynesians 
and Indians as well as of the indigenous peoples; Griffith 
from his concern with Queensland's Kanakas and Aborig-
inals (even a strong critic of Queensland's Aboriginal poUcy 
— Professor J. L. Rentoul of Melbourne University — 
admitted in 1891 that Griffith was "a liberal-minded 
politician interested in the cause of the Kanakas and Abor-
igines, and of all oppressed peoples"'); or in a different field 
both MacGregor and Griffith came to share an interest in 
ItaUan language and literature, MacGregor becoming one of 
the main critics of Griffith's translation of Dante. It is clear 
the friendship developed early. MacGregor's letters to 
Griffith from the first are relaxed and informal and they 
exchanged famUy news as well as commenting on public 
issues of significance to either of them. 
RECOMMENDED FOR NEW GUINEA 
The immediate significance of this meeting was its result: 
8. Professor IVIacrobin to O. C. Waterfield, 3 October 1872, with Waterfleld to 
Meade, 8 October 1872, C O . 167/549/10707, Public Records Office, London. 
9. See Rentoul's criticisms in Brisbane Evening Observer, 19 February 1891, filed 
at COL A/648, 91/01962, Queensland State Archives, Brisbane. 
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Griffith became convinced that MacGregor was the best man 
to be in charge of New Guinea and recommended him 
strongly when he visited London for the 1887 Colonial Con-
ference. This recommendation, supported by MacGregor's 
reputation at the Colonial Office, was enough for him to be 
appointed to the job which he took up in September 1888. 
Thus the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Henry 
Thurston HoUand supported MacGregor because "Sir 
Samuel Griffith spoke in the highest terms of Dr. MacGregor 
and it wiU be a good thing to get an Administrator persona 
grata to Queensland"'", whUe the permanent under-secre-
tary at the Colonial Office, himself an ex-premier of Queens-
land, Sir Robert Herbert, made the intervention of Griffith 
even clearer. He wrote that John Bates Thurston (another 
important official in Fiji) "will no doubt be disappointed 
at not being selected for this post; and probably he would 
have been if he had had the advantage, as Dr. MacGregor 
had, of attending the Federal CouncU and so making the 
Australian Governments aware of his capabilities. I told Sir 
Samuel Griffith that Mr. Thurston is at least as strong a man 
as Dr. MacGregor, and Sir Samuel Griffith said that might 
probably be so, but he did not happen to know anything of 
him personally. 
"It is of great importance to appoint a specially able and 
trustworthy man whom the colonies happen to prefer and as 
soon as we are in a position to do so I think Dr. MacGregor 
should be offered the post"" 
Clearly Queensland was important in MacGregor's 
appointment and his love/hate relationship with Queensland 
was very close liaison between the two. Griffith had been 
years from 1888 to 1898 in charge of New Guinea. The 
friendship with Griffith was maintained and whUe Griffith 
was Premier from 12 August 1890 to 13 March 1893 there 
was to continue .throughout MacGregor's important ten 
responsible for drawing up the complicated legislation by 
which Brkish New Guinea was governed; partly by Great 
Brkain through the Colonial Office which supplied finance 
for the government's steamer The Merrie England, and 
partly by those AustraUan colonies which contributed 
finance — mainly Queensland, New South Wales and Vic-
toria — and Griffith was determined that the system would 
work. 
Their personal letters show how close they were, while 
10. H. T. Holland minute, 12 May 1887, on Griffith to C O . , 12 May 1887, -CO. 
422/3/9257, P.R.O. 
11. R. G. W. Herbert minute, 15 May 1887, on Ibid. 
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dispatches confirm the degree of assistance given by Griffith 
to MacGregor. A typical minute by Griffith in October 1890 
reads: "It has given me very great satisfaction to have had 
the opportunity of assisting Sir W. McG. [WUUam Mac-
Gregor] either officiaUy or personally in the work to wh. 
[which] he devotes the whole of his great abUity and in-
dustry"'^. Or his comment on MacGregor's 1891 Annual 
Report that he was aware "before the appointment of, Sk 
W. McG. [WUliam MacGregor] as Admin. [Administrator] 
of B.N.G. [British New Guinea] of his views as to the 
opportunity wh. wd. [which would] be afforded in the Pos-
session for making a systematic attempt, such as probably 
had never been made before, to bring into the path of 
civilization and industry an almost entirely uncivilized native 
race without any exploitation of cither their land or thek 
capacity for labour . . . [MacGregor's administration] 
hitherto has been conspicuously and remarkably successful 
and . . . if . . . continued on the same principles the British 
rule will prove immensely beneficial to the native race and 
both advantageous and honourable to the Empire"'^ 
Griffith himself drafted letters to New South Wales and 
Victoria about the parlous state of New Guinea finances, 
hoping to keep the system he had inaugurated continue: thus 
he wrote to Henry Parkes and to James Service on 11 
November 1890; "I wd. [would] suggest . . . in view of the 
approaching discontinuance (on 31 March 1892) of the 
British subsidy to the maintenance of the 'Merrie England' it 
wd. [would] be desirable to let . . . the unexpected balances 
from earlier years and any further savings accumulate . . . to 
be applied towards the cost of this vessel"''*. 
RISKS IN EXPLORATION 
Griffith himself revised ordinances submitted from New 
Guinea and was personaUy concerned at the dangers faced 
by MacGregor when exploring the island; "The risks wh. 
[which] he incurred on more than one occasion — notably 
on 12 March when accompanied by a very small party he 
was attacked by a large force of bowmen — were very 
serious and suggest that bearing in mind the great value of 
Sir W. McG.'s [WUUam MacGregor's] life and services to 
the Possession and to H.M.'s Service, and the great blow that 
12. S. W. Griffith minute, October 1890, on COL A/634, 10867, Q.S.A. 
13. S. W. Griffith, handwritten draft, December 1891, on COL A/680, 14078. 
14. S. W. Griffith, November 1890, on COL A/637, 11860. 
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wd. [would] be given to the prestige of the Govt, of B.N.G. 
[Govemment of British New Guinea] if any serious harm 
shd. [should] befaU him and his party, and the grave inter-
ruption that such a calamity wd. [would] cause to the exten-
sion of Govt. [Government] influence in the Possession it 
wd. [would] be wise that . . . he shd. [should] take more 
precautions than appear to have been always taken when 
exploring previously unvisited localities."'^. 
This is the Griffith part of the close relationship with 
Queensland, a closeness which persisted even after Griffith 
left politics to become Chief Justice of Queensland on 14 
March 1893. 
But there was another side to MacGregor's relationship 
wkh Queensland which led him to despair and almost to 
resignation. This side began with his discussions in his fkst 
months of office with the Governor Anthony Musgrave, who 
believed that the power of supervision over New Guinea 
affaks given to Queensland had been given to the Governor 
personally and not to the Governor with the advice of his 
Council. Thus Musgrave argued that he need not consult 
his Cabinet — at that time led by Mcllwraith — and a crisis 
developed. Only the death of Musgrave on 9 October 1888 
ended this crisis. It was a tense situation within the Queens-
land Government as MacGregor told his friend Sir Arthur 
Gordon; "A dreadful storm was brewing and a very warlike 
minute [was] prepared by his Cabinet at the moment Sir 
Anthony died; this document was to show that he was 
acting contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution, in 
advising me without consulting his Cabinet. I have no doubt 
he was wrong, and would not, could not have been sup-
ported by the Secretary of State"'^. 
Musgrave was succeeded as Acting Governor by Sir 
Arthur Palmer who as an ex-politician and friend of his 
Premier, Mcllwraith, wanted the Queensland Govemment 
to have almost sole control of New Guinea, at the expense 
of the Brkish Govemment and the other contributing Aus-
tralian colonies. MacGregor was not happy with this sugges-
tion, especiaUy as he distrusted Mcllwraith's policies. He 
believed with others that Mcllwraith's main motive in 
annexing New Guinea in 1883 had been to control a recruit-
ing field for coloured labour for the Queensland sugar 
plantations. Griffith had been Mcllwraith's main opponent 
of the use of Pacific Island labourers on the Queensland 
sugar fields, having passed legislation to control their re-
15. S. W. Griffith, 28 June 1892, on COL A/707, 10103. 
16. MacGregor to Gordon, 25 December 1888, Stanmore Papers, B.M. 
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eruiting and working conditions and eventually in 1886 an 
Act by which after 31 December 1890 no further licences 
were to be issued for the introduction of Islanders. 
Even if Mcllwraith did not have this motive in annexing 
New Guinea the important fact is MacGregor's beUef that 
he had — hence MacGregor had been disturbed by the de-
feat of the Griffith ministry (which had been in office skice 
13 November 1883), in the elections of May 1888. Sub-
sequently Mcllwraith had come into power in June, just 
when MacGregor left Fiji. Herbert at the Colonial Office was 
displeased that MacGregor had left, for it "may be months 
before he is required in New Guinea. Sir Thomas Mcllwraith 
may even raise objections to his appointment"'''. 
The hate part of the relationship with Queensland was 
then dominant when MacGregor reached Brisbane, for both 
the Governor (Musgrave) and the Premier (Mcllwraith) 
were suspicious of MacGregor's powers. MacGregor knew 
well how awkward was his position, telling Gordon on 25 
December 1888; "in Queensland Griffith is a safe, able and 
enlightened man, but he has been turned out solely and 
simply because he has been called an ImperiaUst: and 
Mcllwraith who is an able bully, with a face like a dugong 
and a temper like a buffalo, has come into power because he 
has dubbed himself a Nationalist . . . such things . . . [have] 
a special bearing on British New Guinea. The Possession is a 
thing of some intrinsic importance but not of such value as 
to induce the Imperial Government at any time to support 
a policy here which would be contrary to the wishes of the 
Queensland Cabinet, or which would at all events evoke 
from them active opposition. I am thus quite conscious that 
in any dispute with the Queensland Govemment I should 
have to give in, and therefore I have to be careful to avoid 
contention. I have no doubt that by working with them 
loyally I shall obtain much more of my own way than if I 
were to attempt to ignore them, which would be flying in 
the face of my Instructions"'^. 
ON DIFFICULT GROUND 
In his difficult position, with a hostile Premier and a 
friendly Leader of the Opposition (in the person of Griffith) 
MacGregor trod warily on difficult ground. He told Griffith 
when he fkst arrived in August 1888 "I find my position 
17. R. G. W. Herbert minute, 19 June 1888, on Thurston to CO. 18 June 1888, 
CO. 83/48/12059, P.R.O. 
18. MacGregor to Gordon, 25 December 1888, Stanmore Papers, B.M. 
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very embarrassing. No one is so well able to advise in such 
matters as yourself, but I have much reluctance to ask you 
to study these matters, because on the one hand you are 
under no official obligation to consider them, and because I 
am not sure how far it would be loyal on my part to the 
present Government to consult the Leader of the Opposkion 
. . . I have to feel my way with — I need not say the Min-
istry — the Premier"'^. 
He survived Mcllwraith, but it was a strain on him as 
these two obstinate Scotsmen clashed continuaUy. Mc-
llwraith relinquished the Premiership due to ill health on 30 
November 1888 and MacGregor wrote, in relief, three 
weeks later; "I estimate that I had to bear more insolence 
from Sir Thomas Mcllwraith than I have had to tolerate in 
the sum total of my previous existence; but somehow I had 
come to the conclusion that he wished to provoke a quarrel 
and I made up my mind that I should put up with anything 
rather than faU to obtain a start"^". 
Mcllwraith's successor as Premier was Boyd Morehead 
and MacGregor found his attitudes more reasonable, indeed 
he commented four years later that as well as Griffith and 
Morehead "most of the leading men of Queensland are quite 
sound on New Guinea. Mcllwraith would sacrifice it without 
any compunction, but he is not likely to be ever Premier 
again, though nothing is more risky than political prognosti-
cation in Australia. I do not think there is the least likeli-
hood of any unfair treatment of the place as long as I remain 
here"2'. 
MacGregor was justified in so far as Queensland politic-
ians were not to interfere much with his control; he was 
wrong in so far as Mcllwraith was Premier just a year after 
he wrote, from 27 March 1893 to July 1894, when he was 
succeeded by Sir Hugh Nelson tiU AprU 1898 and then by 
Byrnes whose appointment was to lead to the second error in 
MacGregor's statement: for though he had good relations 
with Nelson, in his brief five months of Premiership, Byrnes 
was to clash wkh his British New Guinea Syndicate scheme. 
I have covered that incident before: it was a burst of 
Queensland nationalism agaUist Britain; k partly reflected 
Byrnes' unhappiness at having been slighted in London 
during the 1897 JubUee celebrations. In any case it came at 
the end of MacGregor's governorship and although im-
19. MacGregor to Griffith, 29 August 1888, Griffith Papers, Mitchell Library. 
20. MacGregor to Griffith, 21 December 1888, Griffith Papers, M.L. 
21. MacGregor to Gordon, 24 March 1892, Stanmore Papers, B.M. 
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portant in limiting finance avaUable for New Guinea's de-
velopment, did not personally affect MacGregor. 
PERSONALITY CLASH 
More serious was MacGregor's earUer clash with Queens-
land's Governor Sir Henry Norman, a clash that lasted 
throughout Norman's term from 1889 to 1895. The dispute 
began because Norman insisted on close control over Mac-
Gregor, wanting to see copies of all his dispatches. As well 
Norman argued that the functions of the Queensland Gov-
ernor vis-a-vis the New Guinea administration was more 
than advisory, whereas MacGregor insisted he would accept 
directions only from the Colonial Office. The clash on 
principles was accompanied and intensified by the clash 
between the personalities of the two men. Norman, after 35 
years of military and administrative experience, mainly in 
India, was not disposed in his 60's to accept the arguments of 
a mere Scotsman in his first appointment as head of a colony. 
MacGregor with his natural obstinacy and conviction that 
his arguments must be right, never found compromise easy, 
let alone with a representative of the class of military gov-
ernors that he so disliked. It was a bitter fight, its effects 
being well illustrated by MacGregor's letters. Thus he wrote 
to Gordon in October 1889 soon after Norman had been 
appointed, of a "great and profound disappointment . . . My 
heart was full of grief before and this finally cracked it . . . 
He does not know, never can appreciate, the evil he has done 
. . . I have told him to suppose an artist on fashioning a 
statue [having] to stand by and see a Commissioner of 
Police come and smash it up with a sledge hammer because 
it is not on academic lines, and I have told him that may 
give some idea of my disappointment . . . 
"He cannot help it. He has always been fully occupied, 
and now he cannot keep out of the St. Vitus dance of affairs. 
He has had 70 years of motion and now he thinks it should 
be perpetual. He dare not attempt to cook the Queensland 
cabbage so he turns his restless hands to my KaU pot . . . I 
fear I am an enthusiast and he an idle, ignorant, unimagina-
tive, unsympathetic busybody . . . it would be better to make 
Sir Henry lay foundation stones in Queensland than to cap-
size my edifice in Brkish New Guinea; or that he held in-
spections of hospitals and asylums instead of driving me 
into one of them"^^. 
Five years later the two were even more bitter, especially 
22. MacGregor to Gordon, 30 October 1889, Stanmore Papers, B.M. 
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when Norman queried whether MacGregor's term of office 
was limited to six years though promising to support his 
immediate leave of absence. MacGregor bitterly resented 
Norman's interference and stated flatly that he would never 
return to New Guinea for he felt "like one of Hobson's 
horses, tired and jaded, drawing a four-wheeled vehicle, but 
within sight of home having nearly finished the longer stage 
[over] hiUs, ruts, mires and stones. 
"The comfortable party in the vehicle wish to drive 
beyond the changing station to enjoy the landscape. The 
horse will, if not relieved . . . slip his head out of the collar 
rather than be driven past by those who think not of his 
painful joints and quivering muscles . . . they may give the 
beast a viciously bad character, but they will certainly have 
to change him or stop"^^. 
Eventually, MacGregor contradicted himself and agreed 
to come back to New Guinea after a leave of a year, for a 
second term — which was to last for three years. He 
stipulated certain conditions: improvements in Government 
House and the Government steamer, so that his wife and 
family could stay with him; better pay for his leave; certainty 
that the Government steamer be retained for a further 
period, and finaUy that his designation be changed from 
Administrator to Lieutenant-Governor. The last was the 
most difficult for the Colonial Office to swallow for it, too, 
like MacGregor was in an ambivalent position in relation to 
Queensland: "the real objection . . . is one which we can't 
offer publicly . . . the popular idea of a Lieutenant-
Governor would . . . be someone subordinate to a Govemor, 
and although for purposes of administrative convenience 
MacGregor is practically controlled by the Queensland 
Governor, there is nothing in his Letters Patent giving 
>".:n-nan any legal authority over him. People outside are 
jealously watching our action with regard to New Guinea, 
and if they see this change made they will assume it to be 
part of a deep-laid plot to hand over the natives to the care 
of Queensland planters"^"". 
THE BORDER ISSUE 
The overall picture I have sketched is one of a love/hate 
relationship marked by co-operation on one hand, and clash 
on the other. IronicaUy my next example, wkh considerable 
23. MacGregor to Norman, 5 March 1894, on Norman to C O . 22 June 1894, C O . 
422/9/8282, P.R.O. 
24. G. v . Fiddes minute, 24 January 1893, on Norman to C O . , 13 December 1892, 
CO. 422/7/1149, P.R.O. 
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relevance to the present, is one which came close to agree-
ment in the 1890's, whereas now ki 1973 disharmony and 
disagreement prevaUs. The issue is the boundary between 
New Guinea and Queensland, with which MacGregor was 
closely concerned. By Letters Patent of 10 October 1878, 
the Queensland Coast Islands Act of 1879, and Lord 
Normanby's subsequent proclamation of 21 July 1879, the 
Queensland boundary had been ostensibly extended north-
wards in Torres Strait to include the islands of Saibai, 
Dauan, Boigu and the Talbot group, all just off the coast of 
New Guinea^^. The extension of Queensland was related to 
the future of New Guinea as this extension was made as a 
result of Australian demands for British aimexation of New 
Guinea. Even U not agreeing to annex, the Imperial Govern-
ment was interested in preventing "the islands falling into 
the hands of any foreign Power who might dangerously 
threaten our coasts"^*. 
MacGregor visited the western part of his Possession early 
in his governorship, setting up in 1888 a western division 
with headquarters at Mabudauan on the mainland of New 
Guinea not far from Saibai Island. He was also intimately 
involved in this area by his dealings with the Tugeri tribe 
who led raids on the western part of the Possession from 
Dutch New Guinea. 
John Douglas had been Queensland's Liberal Premier 
when the Letters Patent of 1878 had been signed and he was 
concerned both in the future of New Guinea and in the 
Torres Strait situation, arguing in 1877 that the boundary 
extension would give Queensland "real authority to deal with 
the somewhat doubtful characters" connected with the 
economically significant pearling industry^''. Douglas in 1885 
was appointed by Griffith as resident magistrate of Thursday 
Island and in January 1886 was appointed special commis-
sioner for New Guinea. Soon after this on 1 February 1886 
he recommended that the boundary should be moved south 
for "this is a region in which the native or coloured races 
wUl, in all human probabUity, preponderate. Such a con-
dition of society is not in accordance with the genus of the 
people of Queensland". This typically Liberal argument 
25. The closest analysis of this issue is in P. W. van der Veur Search for New 
Guinea's Boundaries, A.N.U. Press, Canberra 1966, pp. 21-35, supported by the 
same author's Documents and Correspondence on New Guinea's Boundaries, 
A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1966, pp. 21-53. My account uses some documents not 
cited by van der Veur, and concentrates on MacGregor and Griffith. 
26. E.P.B. minute, 25 October 1894, citing an 1878 minute, on Norman to CO. , 3 
September 1894, C O . 422/9/18062, P.R.O. 
27. Douglas memorandum to Governor Kennedy, 27 December 1877, cited van Uer 
Veur, Search, p. 24. 
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suggested to Douglas a re-adjustment of the boundary which 
would "involve a transfer to New Guinea of all the islands in 
the Straits", but he was reluctant to advocate this because of 
nationalistic reasons, knowing "that young States, quite as 
much as old States, are particularly sensitive as to their 
territorial possessions". Yet he finally concluded that "the 
islands of Torres Strait, including the Prince of Wales Group 
(just off Cape York), should be transferred to the New 
Guinea Protectorate"^^. This was an extreme proposal, later 
to be modified even by Douglas who came to advocate the 
central 10th degree of latitude as the boundary. But it was 
based on the logic of the situation which was to be taken up 
by both Griffith and MacGregor. 
Griffith visited New Guinea in December 1891 with his 
two sons, traveUing "to see . . . the kind of work . . . Mac-
Gregor is doing and has to do". He left Cooktown in the 
Merrie England on 12 December 1891 and traveUed round 
the east end then northwards "along about 500 miles of 
coast, landing at many places, and visiting aU the principal 
mission stations"^'. He was struck by the lack of "any sense 
of danger" though stressing that "very much depended on 
. . . [MacGregor's] own personal influence and tact"^° with 
the Papuans. It is possible that the question of Torres Strait 
was discussed on this visit though no mention of it is made 
in either despatches or private letters. 
GRIFFITH'S VIEW 
At the end of the next year 1892 Griffith with Byrnes on 
a visit to Thursday Island and the northern parts of the 
colony went to Saibai and Dauan Islands and in January 
1893 he, like Douglas, recommended that these islands be 
put under New Guinea's jurisdiction. He argued that the 
islands, geographically and ethnologically belonged to New 
Guinea. As weU, as a Liberal he thought, like Douglas, that 
the laws of Queensland were "framed for the govemment of 
civilized and not of primitive people, such as those of Saibai 
who differ in few if any respects from their neighbours on 
the mainland of New Guinea", for whom MacGregor was 
introducing "Regulations for [their] good government . . . 
wkh beneficial effect . . . and which takes full cognizance of 
,28. Douglas, 1 February 1886, Report of Government Resident, Thursday Island, 
for 1885, Queensland Votes and Proceedings, 1886, 1, pp. 489-93. This document 
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their tribal customs and system of land tenure". He thought 
his arguments appUed not only to Saibai, but also to Dauan, 
Boigu and the Talbot Group. 
He admitted there was one contrary argument, as the 
people of these islands as weU as those of Mabuiag "have 
for a long time been employed in the Pearl SheU Fishery of 
which the headquarters are at Thursday Island". If the 
islands were to be annexed to British New Guinea this em-
ployment would be prohibited by MacGregor's native labour 
ordinance which aUowed employment only on vessels which 
were stationed in the waters of British New Guinea. Griffith 
thought that this difficulty could easUy be overcome by "an 
Ordinance aUowing . . . the engagement of . . . [those] 
people . . . in the Queensland Fisheries under the laws of 
Queensland". He therefore recommended that "the islands 
should be transferred to the Possession of British New 
Guinea, to which they naturally belong, whUe the Colony of 
Queensland would suffer no loss by the transfer"". 
Griffith's Govemment drew a boundary line north of 
Douglas' 10° suggestion for the consideration of Britain and 
Sir WUliam MacGregor. 
MacGregor made his first comments in March, soon after 
receiving notification of Griffith's proposal. He claimed to 
"have long entertained the opinion that the present division 
of jurisdiction is anomalous and unfair to the Possession". 
Earlier he had advocated conjoint magisterial jurisdiction in 
the Straits. 
MacGregor based his claim on several grounds. One, the 
closeness of the boundary to the coast of the Possession. In 
going either west or east from the Government station at 
Mabudauan it was "barely possible" to avoid crossing into 
Queensland. Often he had to seek fresh water at Boigu 
Island and commented: "Surely the steamer should be able 
to reach the Station and to anchor there without leaving 
British New Guinea waters". Two, the fact that many of the 
islands (he named Saibai, Dauan, Deliverance, Turnagain, 
the Talbot Group and Warrior) were the natural fishing 
grounds for Papuans from western British New Guinea, 
many of whom had no other means of livelihood; "No one 
can contend that it is an equitable arrangement that Queens-
land should remain possessed of the valuable fishing grounds 
of the Straits right up to within less than a bowshot of the 
mainland of the Possession". Three, the loss of revenue to 
31. Griffith to Norman, 17 January 1893, on Norman to C O . , 3 September 1894, 
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British New Guinea of these fishing areas. Four, the inhabi-
tants of the islands had close relationships with the New 
Guinea tribes, and obtained most of their food from the 
mainland. He disagreed with Griffith's point that they were 
ethnologicaUy simUar, but argued on the ground that they 
had "intertraded from time immemorial". 
He agreed that these islanders should be allowed to work 
in the Queensland fisheries, but wanted more controls than 
Queensland imposed for he advocated a "strict prohibition 
against their being supplied with intoxicating liquor. There 
is perhaps no Aboriginal race on the globe that would not 
in fewer generations than could be counted on one hand be-
come extinct if they obtained intoxicating liquor as native 
labourers do now at Thursday Island". 
MacGREGOR'S NEW PROPOSALS 
He thought GrUfith's boundary line was drawn too far 
north as it excluded too many fishing grounds, and that 
Douglas's advocacy of the 10th degree was politically un-
likely to be granted, so he drew a line between the two of 
these which added the Warrior Reef to British New Guinea. 
One of his comments on nationalism has particular relevance 
even in 1973; "It is, I am aware, a very unusual thing for 
any Government or any community to gratuitously and 
voluntarily cede territory. Such a proceeding seems to be 
contrary to the general striving of human natures"'^. 
Griffith had become Chief Justice in the same month as 
MacGregor made his proposals and not tUl 17 months later, 
on 31 August 1894, did the Nelson Government announce 
that it recommended acceptance of the Griffith line " . The 
Brkish Government saw no objection on their part so action 
seemed likely. Interestingly, and with some modern rele-
vance, the law officers advised that as an Act of the British 
Parliament was necessary for annexing territory to a self-
governing colony the purported transfer in 1879 had been 
illegal. As John Bramston pointed out "if this is good law the 
islands have never fully been added to Queensland"^''. The 
law officers repeated their opinion on 27 Febmary 1895, 
namely that the islands in Torres Strait had not been "legaUy 
annexed to and do not form part of Queensland", so there 
had never been a "complete fusion or incorporation" into 
32. MacGregor to Norman, 23 March 1893, on Ibid. 
33. Nelson to Norman, 31 Augu.st 1894, on Ibid. 
34. J. Bramston minute, 29 November 1894, on Ibid. 
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Queensland^^. As a result a special Colonial Boundaries Act 
of 1895 was passed which ruled that coloiual boundaries, 
which had been either before or after the passing of the Act 
altered by Order in Council or Letters Patent, were to be 
accepted. The Act also provided that in future the consent 
of a self-governing colony was to be required for any later 
alterations^. 
To return from this legal point to the melancholy political 
story. MacGregor was disappointed that the Nelson Govern-
ment had ignored his arguments and made his objections 
clear both by discussion with the Colonial Office when he 
was on leave in England and Europe from July 1894 to June 
• 1895, and in despatches written in England. He bewailed on 
19 March 1895 that the Queensland proposal would 
"transfer the inhabitants of Dauan, Boigu, and Saibai, but 
without their fishing grounds" and hoped that the govern-
ment of Queensland would reconsider as "hitherto [it had] 
shown such clear and manifest desire to be fair and just in aU 
its dealings with the Possession". In the Colonial Office the 
feeling was that the "exact line to be drawn is really a matter 
of indifference" to the British Government, though it was 
admitted that in logic MacGregor should be supported for 
his "contentions appear to be well-founded"". MacGregor 
was asked by the Colonial Office to state "more particularly 
the situation of the fishing grounds" and he replied on 2 
April that practically all the ground to the north of his 
boundary line was "fishing ground". Specifically trepang was 
obtained by Papuans from Warrior Reef, although it was in 
Queensland. Most pearl-shelling would remain in Queens-
land waters even if the extreme boundary supported by 
Douglas was accepted, but MacGregor's boundary "would 
give a small amount of pearl shell ground" whereas the 
Griffith Une gave fishing "of no value"^^. 
These objections went back to Queensland but Nelson on 
31 August reaffirmed their previous position in support of 
the Griffith boundary. Thereupon the British Government 
issued an Order-in-CouncU on 29 June 1896 to revise the 
boundary on the basis of the Griffith proposals subject to 
approval of the Queensland Government^'. 
35. Law Officers (Reid and Lockwood) to C O . , 27 February 1895, C O . 
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APPEAL ON FISHING RIGHTS 
MacGregor on his return to New Guinea had been await-
ing the opportunity to visit the islands so that he could more 
authoritatively answer the questions about which fishing 
grounds were being used by the islanders. His despatch was 
written to the Queensland Government on 13 June, and he 
wrote privately to Griffith, ironically as it was to prove, on 
the very date of the Order-in-Council. "I am afraid my hard 
work on these muddy reefs may not be too acceptable to 
your Government, but it wiU be found that a case is made 
out that cannot easily be set aside wkhout a change of 
boundary in our favour. It was my duty to do this to protect 
the rights of those that cannot protect themselves. Let us 
hope that Queensland may be just over it'"'". 
MacGregor based his official despatch on his careful 
astrononucal observations and triangulation which when 
charted made him sure "that the boundary at present existmg 
or the [Griffith] boundary . . . woyld, k maintained and 
insisted upon, inflict a great and unbearable kijustice on 
several of our coast tribes. So clear is this that I entertain no 
doubt whatever that when the circumstances are known to 
the Government of Queensland they will be wUling to modify 
thek proposals . . . this boundary line . . . [puts] a great, 
perhaps the greater part of the fishing grounds of these tribes 
on the Queensland side of the line. I wish to say respectfully 
but clearly and distinctiy that these tribes cannot without 
injustice and oppression be cut off from these fishing grounds 
any more than they can be deprived of their hereditary 
garden lands'"". 
He pointed out privately to Griffith some of the practical 
diBBculties of the dispute. Thus there was no real Queensland 
control in the area. "Frankly I am much in doubt that ^ur 
natives could be legally punished for fishing there [on'the 
Warrior Reef] for there is not any land belonging to Queens-
land in sight of these reefs except the tip of Dauan, some 30 
miles distant. I have not raised, nor do I intend to raise, this 
question of jurisdiction for the reason that it might suggest 
kself to foreigners to put boats there and set both govern-
ments at defiance'"'^. 
MacGregor wanted a Commission with Douglas repre-
senting Queensland and one of his magistrates, Bingham 
Hely, representing British New Guinea to discuss exactly 
40. MacGregor to Griffith, 29 June 1896, Griffith Papers, M.L. 
41. MacGregor to Lamington, 13 June 1896, in Lamington to C O . , 9 October 1896, 
C O . 422/10/23770, P.R.O. 
42. MacGregor to Griffith, 29 June 1896, Griffith Papers, M.L. 
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where the boundary should go. Undoubtedly pressed by 
Griffith the Queensland Government led by Nelson agreed 
on 5 October to defer approval of Griffith's boundary untU 
MacGregor next visited Brisbane. They did not approve the 
suggested Commission, not surprisingly as Douglas was stiU 
known to favour his 10th degree boundary and would hardly 
be an advocate of Queensland's insistence on the Griffith 
line. 
But Douglas was called into a private conference with 
Griffith and Nelson in October 1896 and "a fair com-
promise" was worked out between the suggested Griffith and 
MacGregor boundaries. This was that the boundary should 
run from near Bramble Cay towards the centre of Moon 
Passage, in the Warrior Reefs, then go westerly eventually 
passing some three miles south of Turnagain and Deliverance 
Islands. If this was adopted British New Guinea would gain 
Saibai, Dauan, Boigu, the Talbot Group, Turnagain and 
Deliverance Islands, while Queensland would keep Warrior 
Island on which she placed "considerable importance'"'^ 
COMPROMISE ACCEPTED 
MacGregor reaUzed that Queensland had moved towards 
his position and his next visit to the Straits was "to examine 
the Moon Passage . . . with a view to the final adjustment of 
the boundary'""*, and in his dispatch of 1 AprU 1897 he 
virtually accepted the compromise Une''^ . 
The boundary question was never MacGregor's prime 
concern, thus in 1897 and 1898 the murder of one of his 
best officers, John Green, on the Mambare, and the British 
New Guinea Syndicate affair occupied much of his attention. 
But he hoped that the boundary question would finally limp 
to its logical solution. Nelson tried to gain a concession for 
Queensland, of reciprocal recognition of pearl shelling 
licences, but MacGregor opposed this, and eventually in 
February 1898 Nelson asked the British Government to 
prepare an amended Order-in-CouncU on the basis of the 
compromise line. This Order was issued on 19 May 1898 
and all seemed once again set for a Queensland law and the 
end of the issue''*. Relations were close between Queensland 
and British New Guinea with Nelson and the Governor, 
43. See van der Veur, Search, p. 29. 
44. MacGregor to Griffith, 5 February 1897, Griffith Papers, M.L. 
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Baron Lamington, visiting New Guinea in June 1898 and 
both highly praising MacGregor's efforts'*''. 
MacGregor must have been hopeful when he left New 
Guinea in September 1898 but no BiU was ever introduced 
to the Queensland ParUament. The issue was raised re-
peatedly practically every year after he left. Thus in 1901 
Le Hunte, MacGregor's successor, urged a solution as the 
existing boundary was "an inequitable, arbitrary and purely 
unnecessary injustice to the Possession""^. The Common-
wealth Constitution had added complications for its Section 
123 required that both the Queensland Parliament and its 
electors needed to approve any boundary change. 
Rather out of keeping for his reverence for the Constitu-
tion, Griffith as Acting-Governor, presumably because of his 
desire to end the boundary dispute, suggested on 12 Sep-
tember 1901 by-passing the Queensland electors, but the 
British Government refused to support this idea "as an in-
road on the Constitution" urging that "Queensland must be 
left to pay the penalty for its laches in not passing an Act" 
confirming the 1898 Order-in-Council"'. 
In 1903 when Douglas gave a pubUc lecture supporting 
the 1898 Order as a "fair and reasonable solution of the 
question" he had public support again from Griffith, now 
Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, who in his vote 
of thanks to Douglas said that once British New Guinea 
acquired a government in 1888 "it became extremely absurd 
that some of the islands should be governed by Queensland". 
Griffith had changed his position since 1901 for he now pro-
posed a referendum of the Queensland electors^". 
When, for the Commonwealth, Alfred Deakin's Attorney-
General, Sir Isaac Isaacs, suggested possible lines of action 
in 1906, Kidston, then Queensland Premier, merely acknow-
ledged them, and presumably for nationalistic State rights 
reasons nothing was done^'. 
IN GOVERNOR'S ROLE 
MacGregor returned to Queensland as Governor late in 
1909, eleven years after he had left in hopes that the dispute 
was over. He realised as Govemor of a nationalistic State 
47. Lamington to C O . , 1 July 1898, C O . 422/12/17810, P.R.O. 
48. Le Hunte in Annual Report, B.N.G., 1900-01, p. X. 
49. Griffith to CO. , 12 September, and minute of J.S.R., 31 October 1901, C O . 
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51. See van der Veur, Search, p . 33. 
100 
acutely aware of its self-governing rights, and acutely aware 
of criticism from England, that he could not openly criticise 
the poUcies of his responsible ministers. Therefore he was 
hardly likely to write a despatch urging the injustice of the 
unsettled boundary question. He made his views, however, 
quite clear in his report of his visit to the Torres Strait 
islands in 1911, a report which was sent to the Queensland 
Government as well as to Britain. 
I think the message comes out loud and clear in the 
following passages: "Formerly Murray Island had a brisk 
trade with the New Guinea coast from the Fly River west-
ward. This was not carried out directly, it was conducted by 
a privileged tribe at Murray Island through Darnley Island 
and then by Darnley through Warrior Island. In this tedious 
and roundabout way the Murray Islanders obtained their 
canoes from New Guinea, and the Papuans obtained their 
shell ornaments etc. But all that has been brought to an end 
by the Customs barrier that has been rigidly maintained 
during the last half score of years between the Common-
wealth and Papua. This rupture of ancient intercourse has 
been much felt at Murray Island and at other places in the 
Straits". The second quotation reads: "It appears that inter-
marriage between the western coast tribes of New Guinea 
and of those of the islands in the Straits was formerly very 
common. These inter-marriages wUl be less frequent now on 
account of the restrictions imposed on communication"^^. 
But let us leave this issue in 1911, its recent revival is 
not my immediate subject, to suggest that even with these 
criticisms of Queensland's inequitable blindness over the 
border issue MacGregor was not averse to giving praise to 
Queensland's work in the Torres Straits. He praised the work 
of the two Commissioners, the late John Douglas and his 
successor Hugh Milman (for his "human sympathy wkh 
these people" based on long experience) and was confident 
that this was backed by the Home Secretary, George Appel, 
who he believed was "very sympathetic towards the Abor-
igines of this State". OveraU he concluded that "the island 
population is not neglected by the Government of Queens-
land"^^ 
INTEREST IN ABORIGINES 
My argument is that MacGregor always tried to be 
scrupulously fair in his judgments and the same balance can 
52. MacGregor to C O . , 20 July 1911, p. 866 (p. 4 of despatch). Governor's Out-
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be seen in most of his arguments about Queensland policy. 
As the care of primitive people was so much at the centre of 
his attention, it is very relevant to study his views on 
Queensland Aboriginal policy. When he left New Guinea in 
1898 he was aware that the Governor of Queensland, Baron 
Lamington, had wrkten to the Colonial Office, pleadmg for 
the continuance of British interest in New Guinea especiaUy 
because he distrusted Queensland's control. Byrnes, thought 
Lamington, had no sympathy with the Aborigines who he 
argued were bound to disappear and as well Byrnes de-
fended the treatment that they had suffered as having been 
perfectly justifiable'^''. MacGregor returned to a Queensland 
StiU under an 1897 Act dominated by the philosophy of 
smoothing the pillow of the dying race. This was expressed 
by the Queensland Home Secretary in 1921; "He did not 
know that there had been any definite policy in Queensland 
that properly dealt with the treatment of Aborigines. Gov-
ernments came and went, and, of course, the Aboriginal was 
a decaying race and was not given much consideration"^^. 
MacGregor had no illusions about the faUure of Aborig-
inal policy in Queensland. Thus the conclusion to a 1914 
report he wrote as Governor was pessimistic. "In the vicinity 
of towns they manage to obtain a certain amount of alcohol, 
or opium if there were Chinese in the district. Dirt, rags, 
venereal disease, hunger and exposure are hurrying the 
native race to extinction, and, so far, it would not appear 
that there is to be any survival of the fittest in this race any 
more than the case of the aboriginal Tasmanian, or Beothic 
of Newfoundland. 
"Unless some success attend the stations under the man-
agement of the several churches another fifty years (i.e. to 
1963) wiU extinguish the native race in Queensland"^*. 
There was a debate in the Queensland Legislative 
Assembly ki 1913 on the Aborigines in which there was 
some criticism of the 1897 Act but most attitudes were com-
placent. Again there were exceptions, even if complacency 
was dominant in the Home Secretary's Department, thus 
the responsible minister was George Appel whom Mac-
Gregor again praised as being "just, conscientious and 
54. Lamington to CO. , Secret, 5 August 1898, C O . 422/12/20544, P.R.O. 
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[having] humane feelings" and as being seriously concerned 
in improving the lot of the Aborigines^^. 
MacGregor's evidence came from his touring all over 
Queensland observing Aborigines in their own camps, where 
he was struck by the paucity of women and chUdren and 
that their condition was "wretched ki the extreme"^^ 
Specifically he based it on his visit to the Government 
stations at Barambah (later Cherbourg) and Taroom. At 
Barambah he thought rations were insufficient; the lock 
(venereal disease) hospital was poor — it was buUt of iron 
and he found the "inmates were outside under blankets they 
had spread on branches so as to escape the heat of the 
building and the rays of the sun"; huts were poorly built and 
equipped; pay was meagre^'. At Taroom agricultural efforts 
were hopeless, prickly pear was spreading, there was no 
education provided nor any medical care given; there was no 
nurse, most suffered from ophthalmia — spread by the 
myriads of house flies; the "Superintendent had no medicine 
chest; no preserved milk, no arrowroot, no lotion to dress 
wounds with, no eye lotion for ophthalmia"*". 
APPRAISAL OF AUSTRALIANS 
These and other blots on Queensland policy sincerely 
worried MacGregor and he ventUated them in Australia and 
Britain, hoping for improvement since he believed in 
Queensland. These blots did not overcome his growing 
liking for the State, which was becoming more his home 
than England or Scotland. Part of his motivation for his 
strong support to the new University of Queensland was his 
hope to maintain high standards, especially in research 
which could improve the State*'. For instance, he wanted 
more scientific investigation of agriculture, especially the 
sugar industry, the expansion of which — now without 
Kanaka labour — he supported quite strongly*^. 
Although he finally returned to Scotiand he was unhappy 
there and identified himself more with Queensland and Aus-
traUa. Thus he wrote to Griffith in 1915; "Perhaps k is 
natural that in a new country like Australia the human 
intellect should be more sensitive than it is in the artificial 
life of this country. Taking the people aU round, in England 
57. Ibid, pp. 15-16, and Q.P.D.. 1913, CXV, pp. 1627-40. 
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and in Australia, I am decidedly disposed to say that the 
Australian, though perhaps not the more learned, is at the 
same time the better educated and understands better the 
natural history of man"*^ 
Despke his criticisms of Queensland's Aboriginal poUcy 
he eventually argued that AustraUans, including Queens-
landers, would be better fitted to control primitive people 
than the British. In 1917 he wrote to Sir Ronald Ferguson 
— the British Governor-General of Australia — "I have 
never doubted that the islands of the Westem Pacific must 
become Australian. My administration in Papua was carried 
on from first to last with that object in view. In the face of 
the facts that the Commonwealth has the experience gained 
in Papua, is to remain white, and is the only source from 
which the island trade can be developed, I am incUned to 
think that aU islands to be taken from Germany west of Fiji 
might be made dependencies of Australia at once. But 
should it be deemed desirable that there be a High Com-
mission authority over them, then it must surely be perfectly 
clear the High Commissioner should be the Govemor-
General of AustraUa (i.e. not the Govemor of Fiji). To 
provide otherwise for their administration would be tanta-
mount to saying that the welfare of the islanders could not 
be entrusted to the Commonwealth, which in the face of the 
experience of Papua would be very illogical"*''. 
Logic was his watchword; it was illogical to have the 
Torres Strait boundary where it was, it was illogical not to 
accept the changing attitudes towards primitive people in 
Australia. His views must have been swayed by contact with 
Liberals such as Griffith. By the year in which he died, 1919, 
logic had led MacGregor to the conclusion that Australia 
and New Zealand "now possess a large number of officers 
better acquainted with the islands and with their inhabitants 
than could be provided by any other power, even by the 
Imperial Government itself. The basis upon which native 
administration has been carried out under the British flag in 
the Pacific can be studied by anyone in the case of Fiji and 
Papua . . . since 1906, Papua has been a dependency, and its 
administration has been under the direct control of the 
Federal Government. There is, therefore, before the world 
a practical example of the kind of administration that it may 
63. MacGregor to Griffith, 26 February 1915, Griffith Papers, M.L. 
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be safely assumed would be extended under the Federal 
Government"*^. 
I have tried to iUustrate facets of Sir WiUiam MacGregor's 
love/hate relationships with Queensland, and to suggest that 
his support of research and logic has lessons for the present. 
Overall both aspects are interrelated, and appUcable to 
many. 
If I can conclude on a personal note as an outsider who 
has also a love/hate relationship with my adopted State of 
Queensland — I, like MacGregor, often long for more logic. 
MacGregor could be opinionated and stubborn but his con-
clusions were based on logical analyses. 
65. Interview with MacGregor, published after his death. 'Rule in the Pacific', 
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